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1 Huub de Jonge undertook a short research visit to West Kalimantan in 2002,
Gerben Nooteboom carried out ﬁeldwork among the Madurese in East Kalimantan
in 2003–2004 and again in 2006. Both had also previously worked among the
Madurese: de Jonge in 1976–77 on Madura and Nooteboom from 1997 to 1999
in East Java.
Why the Madurese? 
Ethnic Conﬂicts in West and 
East Kalimantan Compared
Huub de Jonge & Gerben Nooteboom1
Radboud University Nijmegen
Around the recent turn of the century, violent clashes between Madurese and other ethnic
groups took place in the provinces of West and Central Kalimantan. At least 1200
Madurese were killed, with several hundred thousands internally displaced. However, in
the provinces of South and East Kalimantan, which also have Madurese minorities, such
eruptions of violence did not occur. To reach a better understanding of the background,
conditions and causes of such ethnic violence, we have compared the relationships between
the Madurese and other population groups in conﬂict-ridden West Kalimantan and conﬂict-
free East Kalimantan. The comparison shows that there are signiﬁcant dissimilarities
between the two regions with regard to the ethnic composition of the population, cultural
attitudes, access to natural resources and political competition. Together with the negative
characteristics attributed to the Madurese by other groups, these can largely explain why
this minority, during the recent regime change, became the target of the frustrations and
aspirations of others in the western part of Kalimantan but not in the eastern part.
Between 1996 and 2002, large-scale ethnic clashes took place in the province
of West Kalimantan. In December 1996 and January 1997, it was the
Dayak and Madurese in the district of Bengkayang who were ﬁghting each
other, resulting in between 500 and 1200, mainly Madurese, deaths and
the displacement of this immigrant group from this area. In the ﬁrst months
of 1999, violence erupted in the district of Sambas, this time between
Malays and Madurese, although the Dayak quickly joined in on the side
of the Malays. There were hundreds of fatalities and once again the
Madurese were compelled to ﬂee. Thousands of Madurese left for Madura
or Java, especially those who still had relatives or land in these regions.
About half of the almost 70,000 displaced people from these two clashes
who could not, or chose not, to leave West Kalimantan were placed in
government refugee camps in the capital Pontianak. The other half moved
in with relatives or acquaintances in Madurese quarters in and around the
city. In 2001, after a series of smaller incidents, serious violence broke out
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2 As reported in the Jakarta Post, March 4, 2001 “State minister for Women
Empowerment/Chairperson of the National Family Planning Board Khoﬁfah Indar
Parawansa warned of the possible spread of the ethnic conﬂicts in Sampit and
Palangkaraya to Sambas in West Kalimantan and Samarinda, the capital of East
Kalimantan. ‘I have informed the National Police Chief Gen. Bimantoro that there
are indications the ethnic conﬂicts will center in those areas’.”
between these displaced Madurese and members of other ethnic groups.
In the same year, violence also erupted in Sampit in Central Kalimantan
with ﬁghts between Madurese and Dayak resulting in at least 500 deaths
and the evacuation of almost the entire Madurese population of Central
Kalimantan, about 150,000 people in total, to Madura and Java (HRW
1997; Sisi Gelap 1999; Petebang & Sutrisno 2000; ICG 2001; Rochman
Achwan et al. 2005).
The atrocities which accompanied the clashes, and the scale on which
these took place, shocked the whole nation and exceeded those in other
conﬂict areas in Indonesia. In many places in Kalimantan, mutilations,
beheadings and acts of “cannibalism” accompanied the riots. Madurese
homes were set on ﬁre, their cattle killed and other possessions destroyed.
Those Madurese who did escape and hide in the forests were hunted for
weeks afterwards. All traces of their presence were wiped out. In Sambas,
where eﬀectively the Madurese were ethnically cleansed, only banana trees
and disused mosques indicate where they once lived.
In the ﬁrst months following the start of the conﬂict in Sampit, fears
arose that violence would spread to South and East Kalimantan, other
areas with a signiﬁcant Madurese population. This fear was understand-
able as the Sampit violence had fuelled further incidents in West Kalimantan
and also because Dayak from other parts of the island had joined the ﬁght
against the Madurese in Central Kalimantan. Khoﬁfah, a national politi-
cian, referred to Samarinda, the capital of East Kalimantan, as the third
‘S’ after Sambas and Sampit, and the next logical link in the chain of riot-
ing. Many saw an outbreak of violence against the Madurese in these
provinces as only a matter of time.2 However, contrary to this expecta-
tion, mass ethnic violence did not break out, although in East Kalimantan
in particular tensions ran high and nearly led to an outburst of violence
at the end of 2001 and again in November 2005.
Over recent years, political scientists, historians, geographers and anthro-
pologists have reﬂected on these conﬂicts, predominantly drawing on their
own disciplinary backgrounds. Broadly speaking, three types of explana-
tions are eminent: cultural, institutional, and economic (Nooteboom 2005).
In the cultural explanation, the emphasis is on the cultural and symbolic
diﬀerences between the ethnic groups involved (Schiller and Garang 2002).
In the institutional interpretation, importance is attached to the changes
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in the way the state was organised during and after Suharto’s New Order
(Davidson and Kammen 2002; Van Klinken 2002; Davidson 2003b; Bertrand
2004). In the economic explanation, access to natural and state resources
is seen as central to any understanding of the conﬂicts (Peluso and Harwell
2001; Heidhues 2001). Most authors, nevertheless, agree that these expla-
nations should not be viewed in isolation. However, even when they are
combined, they do not adequately explain where the hatred against the
Madurese, small minorities in all the provinces, came from and why it
resulted in widespread violence in two provinces and not in others. The
Madurese are the only indigenous inhabitants of Indonesia who have become
targets of ethnic violence since the end of the New Order regime. Conﬂicts
in other areas of Indonesia; in Aceh, the Moluccas and Papua; have not
faced a similar dimension (Bertrand 2004: 45).
To gain a better insight into the conditions and factors that have trig-
gered or, so far, prevented violence against the Madurese, we have com-
pared the cultural, economic and political dimensions of the relationships
between the Madurese and other ethnic groups in two provinces that are
strife-torn West Kalimantan and violence-spared East Kalimantan. Such a
comparison may add to a more balanced picture of the position of the
Madurese in the conﬂicts and explain what gave them an ethnic dimension.
In the following sections, we respectively describe the migration of the
Madurese to West and East Kalimantan, outline their main socio-economic
and cultural characteristics and deal separately with the aforementioned
cultural, economic and political circumstances in each province.
The Madurese in West and East Kalimantan
For centuries, the Madurese have left their dry, infertile and overpopulated
island to make a living elsewhere (de Jonge 1988; Nooteboom 2003). Already
by 1800, more Madurese lived outside Madura than on the island itself.
Most of the migrants settled in Eastern Java, but in the 19th century small
numbers also left for northern destinations. After 1900, migration to
Kalimantan increased. In the 1920s and 1930s, West Kalimantan saw a
large inﬂux of Madurese when the area was opened up by the Dutch, and
this was repeated in the 1970s and 1980s when the New Order regime
started to exploit the area’s natural resources on an unprecedented scale.
In both periods, the demand for labour increased considerably (cf. Hendro
2001: 76–87). In East Kalimantan, which is further away from Madura
and where colonial expansion started earlier, large-scale migration from
Madura only began in the late 1970s and tended to be directed at the
cities of Balikpapan and Samarinda.
Most of the migrants to Kalimantan originate from Bangkalan and
Sampang, the most western and poorest districts of Madura. Unlike the
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3 One exception is the village of Maduredjo near Martapura in South Eastern
Kalimantan, which was established in 1938. Between 1938 and 1940, 408 families
(1,306 people) migrated to this village (Grader 1949: 15–18; de Jonge 2004: 98).
Despite this, it is remarkable how often Madurese transmigrants are mentioned in
popular publications as the source of the problems.
4 These ﬁgures do not include temporary workers or those who regard them-
selves as temporary residents. They are also based on ethnic self-deﬁnition which
means that any Madurese from the island of Java who chose not to label them-
selves as Madurese were excluded from the total.
5 According to Rochman Achwan et al. (2005: 3), in earlier population counts,
the number of Madurese was always and purposefully underestimated. For exam-
ple, on the eve of the 1996 ethnic conﬂicts, West Kalimantan had about only
90,000 recorded inhabitants of Madurese descent: less than 3% of the more than
3.3 million inhabitants of the province (cf. Proﬁl Kependudukan 1994; Petebang
and Sutrisno 2000: 162–166).
6 Undoubtedly the ﬁgures have been manipulated to show equal populations.
7 In the aftermath of the Confrontation, government-initiated violence by the
Dayak against the Chinese, who were seen as sympathetic towards communism,
broke out (Heidhues 2003: 235–271).
Javanese and other population groups, who were often recruited by the
colonial or Indonesian administrations, the Madurese tended to migrate by
choice rarely joining the so-called transmigration projects.3
According to oﬃcial ﬁgures, Kalimantan had more than 5.4 million
inhabitants in 2000, of which 4.92% identiﬁed themselves as Madurese.4
West Kalimantan was home to more than 3.7 million of these inhabitants,
of whom slightly more than 200,000 or 5.5% of the total were Madurese
(Suryadinata, Ariﬁn & Ananta 2003: 7, 175–178).5 The group paled in
comparison next to the Dayak and Malays who each accounted for 33.8%
of the population.6 The Chinese, Javanese and Buginese groupings accounted
for 10%, 9.4% and 3.3% of the total respectively. The areas with the
largest numbers of Madurese were Pontianak, the provincial capital, and
the districts of Sambas (now divided into Sambas, Bengkayang and
Singkawang), Outer Pontianak and Ketapang. Very few Madurese were to
be found in the districts of Sangau, Sintang and Kapuas Hulu.
Before World War II, the Madurese helped in opening up forest land
for plantations, or eked out a living as coolies or petty traders. As soon
as they had earned enough, they bought or leased land from Dayaks or
Malays, on which they planted and cultivated rice, corn, peppers, coconuts
and fruit trees. Towards the end of the 1960s, many Madurese leased ﬁelds
which had previously been cultivated by the Chinese when the latter were
banished to the cities in the aftermath of the so-called Konfrontasi with
Malaysia.7 During the New Order period, newcomers mainly worked in
the building industry, on road construction, and in the informal and trans-
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8 It is likely that the real number of Madurese is much higher. The secretary
of the Kerukunan Keluarga Masyarakat Madura (KKMM), the Union of Madurese
estimates the number to be around 90,000 or 3.6 percent of the population.
9 During the Japanese occupation an unknown number of romushas, forced labour-
ers, were recruited from Madura to work on plantations and infrastructural projects.
port sectors. The Madurese were dominant among the owners and drivers
of minibuses and pedicabs.
Giring (2004: 31–32, 44, 64), in analysing the ﬁghting between Dayaks
and Madurese in 1997 in the village of Salatiga, 90 km north of Pontianak,
writes that the Dayak, Malays, Javanese and Madurese competed for the
ﬁelds vacated by the Chinese. In 1967 the village included about 30
Madurese households, and this number had grown to 240 in 1996, at
which time the Dayak population consisted of 200 households. Despite
their minority position, since the 1960s, several Madurese succeeded in
gaining the position of village head, which encouraged the growth in
Madurese settlers.
In East Kalimantan, the Madurese made up only 1.2% of the total
population of almost 2.5 million in 2000.8 This made the Madurese the
sixth largest ethnic group in East Kalimantan, behind the Javanese with
29.6%, Buginese with 18.3%, Banjarese with 13.9%, Kutai Malay with
9.2% and the Dayak with an estimated 4.3% (BPS 2001; Suryadinata,
Ariﬁn, and Ananta 2003: 7). Most of the Madurese in East Kalimantan
live in the cities of Balikpapan and Samarinda.
Prior to World War II, most of the Madurese in this province were
employed as unskilled labourers on plantations and in the mining and oil
industry of Balikpapan.9 The migrants who arrived from the late 1970s
onwards are mainly engaged in road construction, the recycling business
(used iron, tyres), petty trade, brick making, logging, and the building and
transportation sectors. Some became very successful, owning heavy machin-
ery and large trucks. The majority, however, remain unskilled labourers
in the lower echelons of society. In contrast to West Kalimantan, many
Madurese are temporary migrants and seldomly settle in the countryside.
Economically, the Madurese in West Kalimantan tended to be better
oﬀ than other ethnic groups although the diﬀerences were not as large as
is often asserted. In East Kalimantan, conversely, they are generally poorer
than members of other population groups. How they diﬀered more fun-
damentally, however, was in their attitude towards work. The Madurese
tended to accept any available work; for example, they were willing to col-
lect garbage in the cities and break up rocks for the construction of roads.
They would do anything to work their way up. Used as they were to hard
work and saving, they were often more successful than others in similar
work, and this frequently led to amazement and jealousy among other eth-
nic groups.
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It is widely claimed that the Madurese have tended to spatially iso-
late themselves from others (Peluso and Harwell 2001: 103). In this, how-
ever, they do not diﬀer from other ethnic groups who also prefer to live
closely together. In the cities in West Kalimantan, the Madurese have
tended to live in their own quarters, and in the countryside in their own
hamlets, neighbourhoods or streets. In some villages they were a minority,
in others a small majority. In Bengkayang, they generally lived alongside
the Dayak; and in Sambas mainly with Malays. With both groups, as with
the Chinese to whom they sold agricultural products, they maintained
acceptable, even cordial, relationships for decades. Nevertheless, there were
regular misunderstandings and incidents, in particular with the Dayak.
Marriages between Malays and Madurese, who are both largely Muslim,
were not uncommon, and most of the Madurese spoke the local Malay
dialect. That mutual understanding was not as bad as it sometimes now
appears, is evidenced by the fact that, on the eve of the attacks, members
of diﬀerent ethnic groups were still patrolling together at night and in sev-
eral villages, Madurese inhabitants were both warned of the impending
danger and sometimes even safeguarded by neighbours.
In East Kalimantan, the Madurese also tend to settle in close prox-
imity to each other, often in groups based on occupation and descent. In
Balikpapan and Samarinda, they live in old quarters close to the harbour
and the city markets. Clusters of brick makers from rural Bangkalan can
be found on the outskirts of cities on unused lands. Temporary labourers,
predominantly from eastern Java and Sampang, live in barracks or deserted
houses throughout the cities. Those who stay for longer do occasionally
mix and interact with other ethnic groups such as the Javanese, Banjarese,
Kutai Malay and Butonese, but relationships with the Buginese, the sec-
ond largest ethnic group in East Kalimantan, have always been tense.
Traditionally, contacts with the Dayak have been relatively cordial, although
these rarely take place since most of the Dayak in East Kalimantan live
in the interior of the province, far from the urban centres.
As with other ethnic groups in Kalimantan, the Madurese cherish
their own norms and values and stick to their traditions. Generally speak-
ing, they tend to live soberly, save money to invest, marry young and 
work together. They usually provide accommodation for arriving migrants,
often relatives or former fellow-villagers, and help them to ﬁnd work. As
peasants, unskilled or lowly-skilled labourers they are not attracted to edu-
cation. According to Hendro (2001: 72), the majority can neither read 
nor write. Children are often kept away from school to help in making a
living. Only religious knowledge seems to be appreciated. The Madurese
are, generally speaking, pious Muslims who conscientiously meet their 
ritual obligations. In East Kalimantan, several Madurese pesantren, religious
boarding schools, have been founded, although well-to-do Madurese 
will often send their children to pesantren in Madura and Eastern Java.
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Some have even made the hajj. In West Kalimantan, almost all the Madurese
kampong (neighbourhoods) used to have their own mosque, their own reli-
gious leaders and observe Islamic rituals and celebrations within their 
own community. As followers of Nahdatul Ulama (NU), they despise the
modernist ideas that are popular among the Malay, Buginese and Banjarese.
The migrant community has, despite some internal divisions, a high degree
of solidarity, which members of other ethnic groups often see as exclusiveness.
According to many Dayak, Malay, Buginese and Banjarese informants,
the Madurese have hardly adapted to their new social environment and
look down on others. Their behaviour is said to be arrogant, short-tempered,
macho-like, rude, uncivilised, unfair, avaricious and revengeful: all widely-
used characterisations and stereotypes that have been applied to the Madurese
over long periods and which, in times of crisis, acquire additional signiﬁcance
(de Jonge 1995). Many of the Madurese born in Kalimantan blame this
negative image on newcomers, who they claim do not know how to behave,
and on preman (thugs) who are often members of criminal gangs involved
in illegal logging, operating brothels and gambling dens, and smuggling
consumer goods from Sarawak into the country. According to them, these
people cast a slur on the whole Madurese community. Dayak, Malays,
Buginese and Banjarese tend to overlook the fact that these types of gangs
also exist within their own groups. These various, ethnically-organised,
gangs are competing hard with each other, and do not eschew violence.
Nevertheless, such stereotypes have contributed a fair amount of suspicion
and hatred towards the Madurese. As is often the case in such situations
(see Elias 1965: 11–12), it seems that the images of the Madurese are
largely determined by negative characteristics and by the worst elements
in their group, whereas the images of the Dayak and others are painted
by positive features and the best individuals in their midst.
An important diﬀerence between the Dayak, the Madurese and other
ethnic groups concerns the ‘culture of violence’ prevalent in the former
two groups (HRW 1997). In contrast to the Malays, the Chinese and most
other immigrant groups in Kalimantan, the Dayak and the Madurese tend
to resort to violence to solve serious conﬂicts. In the event of adultery, the
theft of scarce resources, or an insult; an uneducated Madurese will resort
to carok, the practice of eliminating an adversary with a sickle (celurit).
Violence of this kind is always linked to a conﬂict between individuals or
families in which honour is at stake and members of the wider group will
not interfere. If the family of the victim of a ‘revenge’ attack disputes the
justiﬁcation, a vendetta may result that can last for generations (Smith
1997, 2000; 2004; de Jonge 2002; Latief Wiyata 2002). Among the Dayak,
a conﬂict is preferably resolved using ﬁsts, which is without the shedding
of blood. However, if blood does ﬂow, the whole clan will join in and vio-
lence can easily become communal. Participants drink from the mangkok merah,
a red bowl ﬁlled with chicken blood and other ingredients that symbolise
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10 Those who did not opt for a resettlement location got a lump sum to ﬁnd a
new place on their own, which in practice meant that they moved to a new loca-
tion in or around the capital.
warfare. After the strife has run its course, reconciliation takes place and
compensation is paid by the losing party (HRW 1997; Schiller and Garang
2002: 244; Peluso 2006). In disputes which get out of hand between the
Dayak and Malays or Chinese, the same procedure has been followed. In
the recent past, several similar peace settlements have also been concluded
with the Madurese, but the Dayak claim that the Madurese seldom observe
the peace terms. As a result of this ethnic distrust, most of the Madurese
from West Kalimantan are not welcome if they try to return to their former
villages from the refugee camps. Consequently, after the camps were closed
a few years ago, many chose to set up home in the capital, while a smaller
number settled in resettlement locations around the capital.10
Violence in West Kalimantan
The number of communal clashes between Madurese and other population
groups prior to the ethnic clashes at the end of the 1990s is not as large
as is often supposed (HRW 1997; Giring 2004: 167–169). Petebang and
Sutrisno (2000: 203) refer to ‘riots’ in 1933 in Sukadana (in the district of
Ketapang that was not involved in the recent turmoil), but in reality this
was a revolt by a small number of Madurese who were sold as slaves to
local employers by a boat captain. For a long period, there were no conﬂicts
between the Dayak and the Madurese involving large numbers of people.
It was not until 1977, when a Madurese stabbed a Dayak policeman that
riots broke out in Samalantan killing ﬁve and destroying 72 houses. In
1979, an attack by some Madurese on a Dayak again led to communal
clashes in the same area (resulting in 20 killed and 92 houses burned
down). Following a peace settlement, orchestrated by the provincial gov-
ernment, a memorial was erected to help keep the agreement alive.
Unfortunately this did not work, and in 1983 and 1993 both parties again
confronted each other. Naturally, these incidents increased tensions between
the Madurese and the Dayak, and also had detrimental eﬀects on the rela-
tionship between the Madurese and the Malays, but they were not in them-
selves the cause of the ethnic ‘wars’ that broke out in the late-1990s.
Nevertheless, they did reinforce existing images, contributing to a climate
of hatred and fear, and served to identify scapegoats for the prevailing dis-
content, thus facilitating mass mobilisation against the Madurese.
It is generally accepted that characteristics attributed to population
groups are, in themselves, seldom the reasons for taking up arms, but rather
that it is changes in local or regional circumstances, or changes in the 
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relationship with the wider society, which pits ethnic groups against each
other. With regard to the conﬂicts between Dayaks and Madurese, several
authors have drawn attention to the economic marginalisation of the Dayak
in East Kalimantan during the New Order regime. Peluso and Harwell
(2001) have described how huge tracts of forest areas over which the Dayak
had exerted territorial rights in colonial times were juristically reclassiﬁed
as state land during the Orde Baru period. Whereas the colonial state had
deﬁned all forest land used by the Dayak for slash and burn cultivation
and meeting other needs as ‘native’ lands controlled by customary law,
and classiﬁed the unused forest as nature, under Suharto, the land rights
of the Dayak were severely restricted, with any land not in constant use,
including fallow land, being categorized and appropriated as state land
(Wadley 2003). Then, as part of the development policy for the province
and the nation, it was redistributed in small parcels to migrants and in
larger parcels among plantation owners and logging corporations in which,
more often than not, the state and its manifestations, such as the army
and provincial branches of ministries, had important stakes. The Dayak
not only had to resettle and to tolerate outsiders settling on land to which
they believed they had customary titles, but they also witnessed them gain-
ing most of the proceeds of the economic developments taking place. Most
of the resources, jobs and proﬁts went to people from outside, people who
looked down on them or ignored their presence, culture and history. The
Dayak had eﬀectively become excluded from land they considered as their
own and blocked from taking part in new enterprises. According to Peluso
and Harwell (2001: 94) “The New Order government established bound-
aries around villages, redesigned whole working landscapes, and ultimately
transformed the lifestyles of thousands of people.”
Not only economically, but also culturally and politically, the Dayak
were sidelined during the Suharto regime. After 1965 they lost almost all
the positions and privileges they had enjoyed in the late colonial period
and during Sukarno’s regime. The holders of power in Jakarta now saw
them as second-rate compatriots who, at least for the time being, lacked
the characteristics of modern ‘Indonesian’ citizens (Bertrand 2004: 45).
Their culture was considered primitive and backward, and not in line with
the national culture. The representatives of the group were seen as unsuit-
able for fulﬁlling the political and administrative functions necessary for
the realisation of Indonesia’s national goals. At the end of the colonial
period, and throughout the Old Order of Sukarno, the Dayak were rep-
resented at all administrative levels in the region. In contrast to the local
Malays and newcomers, during the New Order they were virtually excluded
from positions of power at the local, district and provincial levels (Davidson
2003a).
In the 1990s, the Dayak, made up of various sub-groups with distinct
cultural characteristics, began to agitate in writing (in particular in the
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Kalimantan Review) and through actions against their perceived injustices.
According to Davidson the protests were, above all, the result of activities
by several Dayak NGOs who had made the various Dayak groups con-
scious of their shared deprivation and the urgent need to ﬁght together
for a better future. They created in his view an unprecedented feeling of
unity, solidarity and political awareness. It was this combination of sensi-
tivity, revived self-consciousness and ﬁghting spirit which led to the clashes
of 1997, in the ﬁnal years of the Suharto regime (Davidson 2003b: 70–74).
That the Dayak took out their frustrations and anger on the Madurese
was primarily due to the fact that, within their daily environment, they
felt the greatest distance from this group, with whom they also tended to
have more disputes and conﬂicts than with others. Further, the arrival of
the majority of the Madurese had coincided with the heyday of the New
Order. Thus, although they were not responsible for the radical political
and economic changes, they visibly belonged to the ‘beneﬁciaries’ (Peluso
and Harwell 2001: 114). Day in, day out, the Dayak watched as the
Madurese cultivated what they saw as their land that had been taken away
by the state and sold or leased to migrants. The Madurese were an eas-
ier prey for their wrath than the powerful plantation and logging compa-
nies against which they had also regularly campaigned but without success
(Ibid. 105). Last, but not least, no other group lent itself so readily for 
the creation of an image of ‘the enemy’. The existing stereotypes of the
Madurese, whether true or not, were opportune in turning this ethnic
group into a scapegoat.
During the reformasi (political reformation) which followed Suharto step-
ping down, the Dayak saw a chance to become more prominent in the
political ﬁeld. Their activities, however, alarmed the Malays, who were
afraid of losing their privileged position in the provincial bureaucracy 
and the wider economy. As a counteraction, the Malays used the newly-
introduced decentralisation policy to begin ethnic revitalisation in their cir-
cles. According to Davidson (2003b: 79–80), this was the time that the
Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu (FKPM; Communication Forum of
Young Malays), an organisation dominated by prominent ﬁgures and busi-
nessmen with dubious reputations, was able to channel the discontent and
also, in cooperation with youth and preman, vent their frustrations on the
Madurese. Although the Malays had many cultural similarities with their
Muslim neighbours, and fewer complaints against them than against the
Dayak, in their eﬀorts to secure their own interests they tarred both with
the same brush. By violently distancing themselves from the Madurese,
they also tried to underline their own identity. In comparison with the
Dayak NGO, which created a climate that encouraged the clashes, the
FKPM also played a leading role in the chasing away and liquidation of
the Madurese in Sambas in 1999. In the process of reawakening the Malay
identity, the kraton (palaces) of the former Pontianak and Sambas sultanates
AJSS 34,3_f8_456-474II  7/17/06  1:26 PM  Page 465
466 • Huub de Jonge & Gerben Nooteboom
became centres of Malay history and culture. In January 2002, for example,
a Pertemuan Adat Melayu Sernatau (International Meeting on Malay
Culture) was held in Sambas, attended by representatives of Brunei, Serawak
and the Philippines, with the explicit goal of strengthening the identity and
cooperation of Malays both at home and abroad.
In both the 1997 and 1999 clashes, the Dayak and the Malays were
initially reacting to acts of aggression by the Madurese. However, it is
important to recognise that, although the Madurese were often the ﬁrst to
take up arms, they were never intending to provoke or commit communal
violence. As far as is known, they never left their own areas to attack out-
siders, with the exception of putting up barricades on main roads to inter-
cept potential adversaries. Their part in the communal clashes was defensive
rather than oﬀensive. The clashes could possibly have been prevented if
the army and the police, who have both been accused of lacking impar-
tiality, had taken the earlier signs of animosity more seriously and been
capable of the job at hand. Instead they were overtaken by events and in
the initial weeks, they restricted activities to assisting in the evacuation of
the Madurese. Only later did they try to intervene and halt the violence.
The vulnerability of the Madurese was greater because, unlike the
Dayak and the Malays, they did not possess powerful elite. Among their
religious leaders there was hardly anyone whose authority went beyond
the local community. The only wider organisation that existed before the
ethnic riots was a branch of the Ikatan Keluarga Besar Madura (Union
of Madurese Communities) which had been founded in the 1980s by chief-
of-staﬀ General Hartono with the ulterior motive of gaining Madurese votes
for Golkar, the political party on which the New Order relied. This organ-
isation, which had had good contacts with provincial authorities, now had
(after Suharto’s fall) nothing to oﬀer. After the evacuation of the Madurese,
a few new interest groups were founded, including the Yayasan Korban
Kerusuhan Sambas (Foundation for the victims of the Riots in Sambas)
and a branch of the national Himpunan Mahasiswa Madura (Association
of Madurese Students). Together with the Ikatan Keluarga Madura, the
successor to Hartono’s organisation, they acted as representatives of the
displaced population, distributed supplies from relief organisations, co-ordi-
nated resettlement activities and took part in the deliberations about the
future of the Madurese. However, due to opposition from all sides, plus
internal disagreements and corruption, they had little say in the future,
and were forced to accept that an immediate return to their village was
out of the question for the Madurese.
The ethnic cleansing of the Madurese from the Pontianak hinterland
does not mean that violence is a thing of the past. Both the Dayak and
the Malays have not yet achieved what they are aiming for: a far-reaching
cultural and political domination over the whole province. The Dayak have
taken the most important administrative and political positions in Bengkayang,
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while the Malays have similarly acted in Sambas. Both factions are, however,
far from satisﬁed and continue to aggressively compete to get ahead of
each other. So far, they have aimed their violence at third parties but,
according to members of both ethnic groups, it is only a matter of time
before the Malays and the Dayak violently confront each other.
Echoes of violence in East Kalimantan
In contrast to West Kalimantan, relationships between Madurese migrants
and indigenous Malay and Dayak populations, for a long time, have not
been marked by any hatred, resource competition and violent conﬂicts. It
was only after the ethnic cleansing in Sambas and Sampit that violent
images of Madurese and Dayaks spread to East Kalimantan. In both 
2001 and 2005, the Government of East Kalimantan could barely prevent
Dayak groups, mostly originating from farther aﬁeld, attacking the Madurese.
Until that time, the Madurese and the Dayak people had co-existed rather
peacefully.
However, the relationship between the Madurese and the Buginese
had been much more explosive (Acciaioli 1999: 242). Since the arrival of
large groups of migrants in the late-1970s, many Madurese have occupied
the same economic niches in trade, transport and illegal activities as Buginese
migrants from Sulawesi. This has led to tensions and conﬂicts between the
groups, especially at market places and harbours. During the 1980s and
early 1990s, in the provincial capital Samarinda and the oil city of Balikpapan,
violence between Buginese and Madurese gangs was rampant. The chain
of violence started in 1980 when a Buginese gang leader ( jago) was killed
at the market after he had oﬀended a Madurese. Looking for revenge,
Buginese gang members searched for the Madurese culprit in order to kill
him. At ﬁrst they failed as the perpetrator got help from his Madurese
friends, but later he was found and killed. Since then, there have been
regular clashes between Madurese and Buginese resulting in dozens of casu-
alties. Madurese women and children have also suﬀered harassment and
this has led to retaliatory violence. The violence has also created a climate
of fear and insecurity among other ethnic groups.
The government was unable or unwilling to stop this violence, and
the police tolerated it as long as the violence remained within boundaries.
Only if larger state or elite interests were endangered would the violence
be suppressed, often with strong backing from the military. Among the
police and local business elites, there were people who maintained close
ties with the Madurese as the immigrants are good watchmen and secu-
rity guards, and reliable caretakers of illegal businesses such as gambling
dens, brothels, and illegal logging and trade companies. In return for a
share of the proﬁt, the police tolerated some of these activities and shielded
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perpetrators from punishment as long as the activities remained out of the
public eye. They even regularly recruited local Madurese strongmen to
suppress criminality or to control illicit activities (Nooteboom 2005: 168–173).
Those who were happy to ﬁsh in muddy waters undoubtedly beneﬁted
from a certain level of violence (Van Klinken 2002: 70).
The Madurese also proﬁted from their good relationships with police
oﬃcers and business elites. They managed to maintain these good con-
nections with the police until the mid-1990s. From then on, however,
Madurese gang leaders gradually lost their inﬂuential connections due to
the reallocation of senior police oﬃcers and the waning of Suharto’s New
Order regime which had safeguarded the position of Madurese and Javanese
migrants. When economic and political turmoil spread across the country
as a result of the 1997 economic crisis and the violent outbreaks against
the Madurese in West and Central Kalimantan began, the Madurese found
themselves isolated from local and regional politicians. A shift in elites had
taken place. When Suharto’s old cronies disappeared from the scene, region-
ally-rooted, older elites plus new leaders of Kutai Malay, Banjarese, Buginese
and Dayak descent took their chances. Suddenly, ethnicity, carefully sup-
pressed during the New Order period, had become an issue, and once-
downtrodden groups such as adat leaders and Dayaks tried to get a foothold
in regional politics. This process accelerated after the decentralisation laws
of 1999 which oﬀered greater regional autonomy to ‘indigenous people’
( putra daerah).
The new leaders succeeded in suppressing the feuds between the
Madurese and the Buginese, and eliminated most of the gangs, although
ﬁghts among thugs and thieves at markets and in bars are still part of
everyday life. Given that these ﬁghts are now perceived by local people as
inter-ethnic violence, tensions remain. Between September 2003 and February
2004, at least eight ﬁghts took place between Madurese and Buginese in
which at least four people were killed and several others severely wounded.
In contrast with similar events in the past, the provincial governments
reacted nervously to these clashes and killings. Fearing that it might esca-
late into ethnic violence, they forbade all references to ethnicity in the
media, ordered increased police involvement, banned large gatherings of
Madurese, and tried to limit the number of new Madurese immigrants.11
Given the violence in West and Central Kalimantan, with the resulting
11 The government banned Madurese public meetings and established a zero-
tolerance policy towards ﬁghts at hotspots such as market places, cockﬁghting are-
nas and brothels. Indonesian army forces were kept on alert, and police troops
guarded Madurese areas and strategic places. Security oﬃcials from the police’s
intelligence department (Intel) inﬁltrated potential hotspots and stopped any ﬁghts
from spreading by ﬁring into the air, capturing ringleaders, or even shooting some
people in the legs.
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12 See also Van Klinken, 2002: 50.
defeat of the Madurese, the Madurese position was further weakened in
East Kalimantan.
The mass violence in West and Central Kalimantan towards the
Madurese came as a total surprise to them and further traumatised the
Madurese community in East Kalimantan. Although there were no real
violent acts against the Madurese in East Kalimantan, the fear of spread-
ing ethnic violence was based on more than mere rumours. In Samarinda,
Dayak people had allegedly threatened to burn Madurese brick-making
sheds. The spreading news of mass violence in West and Central Kalimantan
also produced very strong images and anti-Madurese sentiments in East
Kalimantan. Although broadcasts on the violence in Indonesia were then
banned, the damage had been done. Images and videos of murdered and
beheaded Madurese and lurid stories were circulating within the province.
For the Madurese, Kalimantan was never going to be the same again.
Essentially, there were three types of reaction among the Madurese
at the time of the conﬂicts in Sambas and Sampit. The ﬁrst reaction was
one of disbelief: many did not really believe that violence would or could
ever spread to East Kalimantan as there had never been large-scale vio-
lence against the Madurese there. The second group reacted with shock
to the news that the violence had spread from Sambas to Sampit, and
realised it could spread further to East Kalimantan. However, they relied
on their ﬁerce reputation, their good relations with their neighbours, on
police oﬃcers and the local elite, and preferred not to leave their prop-
erties, businesses and occupations behind. The last group, made up of
mostly poor labourers and peddlers from the inner cities, simply feared for
their future and tried to escape to Madura as quickly as possible. They
ﬂocked to the harbours taking only the bare necessities such as spare clothes,
jewellery and money. Ultimately, about 10 to 15 percent of the Madurese
actually left.
After the Sampit aﬀair, the provincial government of East Kalimantan
followed a pro-active strategy. The governor, in close cooperation with the
police and the army, brought ethnic leaders, some NGOs and university
lecturers together, and forced the ethnic fractions to make peace in pub-
lic. The Madurese were under-represented in these meetings. The ﬁrst
meeting was held in the old stadium of Samarinda, with the following
monthly meetings in the prestigious Bumi Senyiur Hotel in Samarinda
under the banner of Forum Kommunikasi Persaudaraan Masyarakat Kali-
mantan Timur (FKPMKT), the Communication Forum for Reconcilement
of the East Kalimantan People.12 Only the most important ethnic groups
were represented in this forum. In 2001, another forum was created, the
Forum Komunikasi Antar Suku (FORKAS), the Inter-Ethnic Communication
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13 On November 7, 2005, in the Royal karaoke bar in Samarinda, a Dayak
guest got drunk and hassled a woman at the bar. The security guard ordered him
to leave the establishment. The guest went to his car, took out a piece of iron and
started to hit the security guard. After the third hit, the security guard pulled out
a large knife and stabbed the man in the stomach. He was taken to hospital in a
serious condition. Soon people found out that the security guard was of Madurese
descent. Dayak groups proclaimed that for each Dayak who died, 40 Madurese
should also die. The military made great eﬀorts to prevent the man from dying
and, according to some sources; a dozen soldiers were ordered to donate blood.
Eventually, the Dayak recovered.
14 It is not certain that the Madurese was murdered by Dayak or by others who
wanted to further fuel the conﬂict.
Forum. This forum included a Madurese religious leader, but he only rep-
resented part of the Madurese community. The provincial government
forced him to re-establish the Kerukunan Keluarga Masyarakat Madura
(KKMM), the Union of Madurese, an ethnic association similar to the eth-
nic associations represented in the FKPMKT. The KKMM, however, was
never a success due to diverging interests among ethnic sub-factions, classes
and business leaders. This reﬂects the fact that the Madurese in East
Kalimantan were poorly organised. Although in the eyes of outsiders they
are seen as highly united (kompak), internally, they are strongly divided and
lack good spokesmen.
In November 2005, tensions rose sky high after the son of a Dayak
adat leader was stabbed by a Madurese security guard, with this incident
nearly provoking mass violence.13 Large numbers of Dayak warriors from
all parts of Kalimantan came to Samarinda to seek revenge. One day after
the ﬁght, one Madurese brick-maker was murdered and another wounded.14
Thousands of Madurese peddlers and labourers wanted to leave for Madura
at this point, although only a few hundred actually left. Fortunately, no
further violence occurred, with politicians, the military and the police mak-
ing great eﬀorts to prevent any escalation of the conﬂict. The mayor of
Samarinda and the vice-mayor, who was a Dayak, as well as police and
army representatives tried hard to re-establish FORKAS, which had been
used before, and organised a large peacemaking ritual to calm the people
down.
Although the symbolic power of intercultural communication and the
reconciliation ritual were signiﬁcant, and might have been crucial in cur-
tailing the activities of militant ethnic leaders, for ordinary Madurese
migrants the dialogue had little meaning as they did not feel represented.
There has never been any form of formal Madurese organisation in East
Kalimantan, and the inﬂuence of the KKMM remains limited. Further,
internal divisions and personal power politics have further weakened its
position. Few interethnic conﬂicts have ever been settled by the KKMM,
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and the tough governmental judicial policies have generally been rather
disadvantageous for the Madurese. During the 2005 tensions, the KKMM’s
position was somewhat enhanced, and it is likely that the threat of vio-
lence will further strengthen the role of Madurese organisations in the
future.
Why the Madurese?
A comparison between West and East Kalimantan helps to reach a better
understanding of the resentment and violence against the Madurese resi-
dents while, at the same time, elucidating the rise and course of the eth-
nic tensions and conﬂicts. In both provinces, the Madurese were a minority,
although their presence was signiﬁcantly stronger in the western province.
In West Kalimantan they are heavily outnumbered by local Dayak and
Malays, whereas in East Kalimantan, the ethnic composition of the pop-
ulation is much more varied. In the latter it is an immigrant group, the
Javanese, which has numerical superiority. In both areas, the Madurese
migrants originate from the same poor areas on Madura, share an iden-
tical cultural background — including a similar culture of violence — tend
to settle in their own communities, marry amongst themselves, and to some
extent isolate themselves in their social and cultural lives from other eth-
nic groups. In the western part of Kalimantan, where Madurese migrants
arrived much earlier, the younger generations have lost contact with the
island of their ancestors. In the eastern part, migration started later, and
migrants tend to maintain strong ties with their native soil. In the west, where
the older generation preferred to make a living in the countryside, new-
comers, like the Madurese in East Kalimantan, try to ﬁnd work in the cities.
These diﬀerences in themselves do not explain why the Madurese
became the main victims of ethnic violence in West Kalimantan, or why
there has been little violence in East Kalimantan. If we look, however, at
the economic, political and cultural dimensions of ethnic relationships in
both provinces, they take on another meaning. In West Kalimantan, there
has been strong competition for agricultural resources, especially between
Malays, Dayaks and Madurese, and this has led to frustration and aggres-
sion. One of the main reasons for this is especially the appropriation of
Dayak land by the state during the New Order regime, and the distribu-
tion of a considerable part of this land to newcomers, including a sizable
number of Madurese. Madurese settling in resource-rich East Kalimantan
have been less dependent on agriculture, and the only ethnic group with
which the Madurese here compete, in this case for jobs and business oppor-
tunities, is the Buginese.
Competition in West Kalimantan has not been restricted to the eco-
nomic ﬁeld. During the Suharto years, Dayak, and to a lesser degree Malays
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had to hand over powerful positions in the provincial bureaucracy to civil
servants (often Javanese) from outside Kalimantan and to give up their
political aspirations. During the declining years of the New Order, the elite
of both groups were preparing to reclaim these lost positions, a contest
that eventually involved trampling the Madurese (cf. Van Klinken 2002).
Conversely, in East Kalimantan, the local elites had nothing to fear from
the Orde Baru bureaucracy since their interests corresponded. Even after
the fall of Suharto they retained their positions. In this region, there was
therefore no reason to incriminate the Madurese and some were happy to
cooperate with members of this group. Thus, while in the western province,
local elite seized the opportunity to make a comeback, in the east the elite
put their eﬀorts into maintaining their positions. Any outbreak of mass vio-
lence would have threatened their interests. To date, the East Kalimantan
government continues to be quite successful in preventing ethnic violence.
We would argue that it was these speciﬁc conditions which made West
Kalimantan more susceptible to violence than East Kalimantan, even though
they do not really explain why the violence was primarily directed to the
Madurese. The reason for that can, in our opinion, only be traced back
to the need for a scapegoat, a role to which the despised and culturally
distinct Madurese were suited. They were a small, controversial and vul-
nerable group, whose comings and goings incited resentment, who were
involved in a series of both small and larger violent incidents, and about
whom negative stereotypes abounded. Although their diﬀerences to other
ethnic groups were largely imagined (cf. Schlee 2002: 7–9), they formed a
fertile basis on which to perpetuate violence. Hence, the underlying prob-
lems could be reduced to manageable proportions, ideas and categories.
As is often the case, once the violence had started, the real causes of
the conﬂict were pushed into the background. The accusations assumed a
life of their own and resulted in a violent image of an enemy that was
continually reproduced and re-invented and spread to other parts of the
island. In East Kalimantan, where relationships between the Madurese and
most other groups had not been problematic, antagonism and aggression
towards the Madurese grew. The threat of violence has become closer and
potentially now endangers the lives of the Madurese there. Simply being
Madurese is enough to make one an enemy and perhaps even a victim.
The course of the conﬂict has taken over the cause. As Schlee (2002: 28)
observed in other violent-prone areas: “The conﬂict itself is the ground on
which hatred is cultivated.”
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